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A Note on “Efficient Algorithms for Secure
Outsourcing of Bilinear Pairings”
Lihua Liu1 Zhengjun Cao2
Abstract. We show that the verifying equations in the scheme [Theoretical
Computer Science, 562 (2015), 112-121] cannot filter out some malformed values
returned by the malicious servers. We also remark that the two untrusted programs
model adopted in the scheme is somewhat artificial, and discuss some reasonable
scenarios for outsourcing computations.
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1 Introduction
Very recently, Chen et al. [1] have put forth a scheme for outsourcing computations of bilinear
pairings in two untrusted programs model which was introduced by Hohenberger and Lysyan-
skaya [4]. In the scheme, a user T can indirectly compute the pairing e(A,B) by outsourcing
some expensive work to two untrusted servers U1 and U2 such that A, B and e(A,B) are kept
secret. Using the returned values from U1, U2 and some previously stored values, the user T can
recover e(A,B).
The Chen et al.’s scheme is derived from the Chevallier-Mames et al.’s scheme [2] by storing
some values in a table in order to save some expensive operations such as point multiplications
and exponentiations. Besides, the new scheme introduces two servers U1 and U2 rather than the
unique server U in the Chevallier-Mames et al.’s scheme. The authors [1] claim that the scheme
achieves the security as long as one of the two servers is honest. In other word, a malicious
server cannot obtain either A or B. Unfortunately, the assumption cannot ensure that the
scheme works well, because a malicious server can return some random values while the user T
cannot detect the malicious behavior. As a result, T outputs a false value.
In this note, we show that the verifying equations in the scheme [1] cannot filter out some
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malformed values returned by the malicious servers. To fix this drawback, we should specify
that the servers are semi-honest. We also point out that the two untrusted programs model
adopted in the scheme is somewhat artificial and discuss some reasonable scenarios for outsourc-
ing computations.
2 Review of the scheme
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic additive groups with a large prime order q. Let G3 be a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1×G2 → G3 with the
following properties. (1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ) = e(R,Q)ab for all R ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q.
(2) Non-degenerate: There exist R ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 such that e(R,Q) 6= 1. (3) Computable:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(R,Q) for all R ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2.
The Chen et al.’s scheme [1] uses two untrusted servers U1, U2. The outsourcer T queries
some pairings to the two servers. The scheme can be described as follows.
Setup. A trusted server computes a table Rand which consists of the elements of ran-
dom and independent six-tuple (W1,W2, w1W1, w2W1, w2W2, e(w1W1, w2W2)), where w1, w2 ∈R
Z
∗
q,W1 ∈R G1, and W2 ∈R G2. The table is then loaded into the memory of T .
• Look-up table. Given A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2, where A and B may be secret or protected and
e(A,B) is always secret or protected. T looks up Rand to create
(V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)),
(X1,X2, x1X1, x2X1, x2X2, e(x1X1, x2X2)),
(Y1, Y2, y1Y1, y2Y1, y2Y2, e(y1Y1, y2Y2)).
• Interaction with U1. T sends {(A+v1V1, B+v2V2), (v1V1+v2V1, V2), (x1X1, x2X2), (y1Y1, y2Y2)}
to U1. U1 returns
α1 = e(A+ v1V1, B + v2V2), δ = e(V1, V2)
v1+v2 , β1 = e(x1X1, x2X2), β2 = e(y1Y1, y2Y2).
• Interaction with U2. T sends {(A+V1, v2V2), (v1V1, B+V2), (x1X1, x2X2), (y1Y1, y2Y2)} to
U2. U2 returns
α2 = e(A+ V1, v2V2), α3 = e(v1V1, B + V2), β̂1 = e(x1X1, x2X2), β̂2 = e(y1Y1, y2Y2).
• Verification. T checks that both U1 and U2 produce the correct outputs by verifying that
β1 = β̂1 and β2 = β̂2.
If not, T outputs “error”.
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• Computation. T computes e(A,B) = α1α
−1
2 α
−1
3 δ · e(v1V1, v2V2)
−1.
Remark 1. In the original description of the scheme, the step 2 (see section 4.2 in Ref.[1])
has not specified any actions. It only explains that the pairing e(A,B) can be composed by
the related values. The authors have confused the explanation with steps of the scheme (it is
common that a step of a scheme should specify some actions performed by a participator), which
makes the original description somewhat obscure.
3 The checking mechanism in the scheme fails
In the scheme, to check whether the returned values α1, δ, β1, β2 and α2, α3, β̂1, β̂2 are
properly formed, the user T has to check the verifying equations
β1 = β̂1 and β2 = β̂2.
We now want to stress that the checking mechanism cannot filter out some malformed values.
The drawback is due to that the protected values A,B are not involved in the equations at all.
For example, upon receiving {(A+v1V1, B+v2V2), (v1V1+v2V1, V2), (x1X1, x2X2), (y1Y1, y2Y2)},
U1 picks a random ρ ∈ Z
∗
q and returns
α1 = e(A + v1V1, B + v2V2), ρ, β1 = e(x1X1, x2X2), β2 = e(y1Y1, y2Y2)
to T . In such case, we have α1α
−1
2 α
−1
3 e(v1V1, v2V2))
−1ρ = e(A,B)e(V1, V2)
−v1−v2ρ. That means
T obtains e(A,B)e(V1, V2)
−v1−v2ρ instead of e(A,B).
To fix the above drawback, we have to specify that both two servers are semi-honest. The
term of semi-honest here means that a server can copy the involved values and always returns the
correct outputs, but cannot conspire with the other server. Under the reasonable assumption,
the original scheme can be greatly simplified. We now present a revised version of it as follows.
• Look-up table. Given A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2, where A and B may be secret or protected and
e(A,B) is always secret or protected. T looks up Rand to create
(V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)).
• Interaction with U1. T sends {(A+ v1V1, B + v2V2), (v1V1 + v2V1, V2)} to U1. U1 returns
α1 = e(A+ v1V1, B + v2V2), δ = e(V1, V2)
v1+v2 .
• Interaction with U2. T sends {(A+ V1, v2V2), (v1V1, B + V2)} to U2. U2 returns
α2 = e(A+ V1, v2V2), α3 = e(v1V1, B + V2).
• Computation. T computes e(A,B) = α1α
−1
2 α
−1
3 e(v1V1, v2V2)
−1δ.
3
4 The checking mechanism in the Chevallier-Mames et al.’s
scheme works well
As we mentioned before, the Chen et al.’s scheme [1] is derived from the Chevallier-Mames
et al.’s scheme [2]. But the new scheme misses the feature of the checking mechanism in the
Chevallier-Mames et al.’s scheme. We think it is helpful for the later practitioners to explain
the feature.
In the Chevallier-Mames et al.’s scheme, the outsourcer T wants to compute the pairing
e(A,B) with the help of the untrusted server U such that A,B and e(A,B) are kept secret. The
scheme can be described as follows (See Table 1).
Table 1: The Chevallier-Mames et al.’s scheme
The outsourcer T The server U
{P1 ∈ G1, P2 ∈ G2, e(P1, P2)}
Input: A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2
Pick g1, g2, a1, r1, a2, r2 ∈ Z
∗
q ,
compute A+ g1P1, B + g2P2 Compute
a1A+ r1P1, a2B + r2P2
(A+g1P1,P2)
−−−−−−− → α1 = e(A+ g1P1, P2)
and query them.
(P1,B+g2P2)
−−−−−−− → α2 = e(P1, B + g2P2)
(A+g1P1,B+g2P2)
−−−−−−− → α3 = e(A+ g1P1, B + g2P2)
Compute
(a1A+r1P1,a2B+r2P2)
−−−−−−− → α4 = e(a1A+ r1P1, a2B + r2P2)
e(A,B) = α−g21 α
−g1
2 α3e(P1, P2)
g1g2
α1,α2,α3,α4
← −−−−−−− and return them.
Check that
α4
?
= e(A,B)a1a2αa1r21 α
a2r1
2
·e(P1, P2)
r1r2−a1g1r2−a2g2r1
If true, output e(A,B).
Notice that the true verifying equation is
α4 =
(
α
−g2
1 α
−g1
2 α3e(P1, P2)
g1g2
)a1a2
αa1r21 α
a2r1
2 e(P1, P2)
r1r2−a1g1r2−a2g2r1
= α−g2a1a2+a1r21 α
−g1a1a2+a2r1
2 α
a1a2
3 e(P1, P2)
g1g2a1a2+r1r2−a1g1r2−a2g2r1
where α1, α2, α3, α4 are generated by the server U , and the session keys g1, g2, a1, r1, a2, r2 are
randomly picked by the outsourcer T .
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Clearly, the server U cannot generate the four-tuple (α1, α2, α3, α4) satisfying the above
verifying equation because the exponents
a1r2 − g2a1a2, a2r1 − g1a1a2, a1a2, g1g2a1a2 + r1r2 − a1g1r2 − a2g2r1
are not known to the server. The intractability of the above equation can be reduced to the
following general challenge:
Without knowing a secret exponent θ,findX,Y ∈ Z∗q , X 6= 1, Y 6= 1, such thatX
θ = Y.
5 The remote and shared servers
The authors stress that the two servers U1 and U2, in the real-world applications, can be
viewed as two copies of one advertised software from two different vendors. We would like to
remark that the two copies are neither nearby nor private. They must be remote and shared by
many outsourcers. Otherwise, the user T equipped with two private copies of one software can
be wholly viewed as an augmented user. But the situation is rarely considered in practice.
We now consider the situation that the outsourcer T has to communicate with two remote and
shared servers. If the data transmitted over channels are not encrypted, then an adversary can
obtain A+ v1V1, B+ v2V2 by tapping the communication between T and U1, and get v1V1, v2V2
by tapping the communication between T and U2. Hence, he can recover A and B. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that all data transmitted over channels are encrypted. From the practical
point of view, the communication costs (including that of authentication of the exchanged data,
the underlying encryption/decryption, etc.) could be far more than the computational gain in
the scheme. The authors have neglected the comparisons between the computational gain and
the incurred communication costs. Taking into account this drawback, we think the scheme is
somewhat artificial.
5.1 A nearby and trusted server
Girault and Lefranc [3] have described some situations in which a chip has only a small
computation capability is connected to a powerful device.
• In a GSM mobile telephone, the more sensitive cryptographic operations are performed
in the so-called SIM (Subscriber Identification Module), which is already aided by the
handset chip, mainly to decipher the over-the-air enciphered conversation.
• In a payment transaction, a so-called SAM (Secure Access Module) is embedded in a
terminal already containing a more powerful chip.
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• A smart card is plugged into a personal computer, seeing that many PCs will be equipped
with smart card readers in a near future.
We find that in all these situations (a SIM vs. a handset, a SAM vs. a powerful terminal, a smart
card vs. a personal computer) the servers are nearby and trusted, not remote and untrusted.
6 Conclusion
The true goal of outsourcing computation in the Chen et al.’s scheme is to compute bi-
linear pairings. In view of that pairings spread everywhere in pairing-based cryptograph, we
do not think that the trick of equipping a low capability chip with two untrusted softwares is
useful. In practice, we think, it is better to consider the scenario where a portable chip has
access to a nearby and trusted server. Otherwise, the communication costs could overtake the
computational gain of the outsourced computations.
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